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course that is true. But it is the function of the courts to make sure, in
cases properly coming before them, that the men and women constituting
our armed forces are treated as honored members of society whose rights
do not turn on the charity of a military commander." And in the case of
the Reservist, it is the function of the courts to make sure that a civilian's
rights do not 'turn on the charity of a military commander.
BRUCE V. WEITZEN

THE EFFECT OF THE NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW UPON
THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT
The mental condition of the defendant assumes importance in a criminal proceeding under two distinct legal concepts. The first involves a determination of the responsibility of the individual for the alleged criminal
act and thus revolves around his mental condition at the time of its commission. This gives rise to the so-called insanity defense.' The second concept concerns the individual's competency to proceed at trial. In this con-

text, attention is focused upon the mental state of the individual prior to
and during the judicial proceeding.2 The purpose of this comment is to

critically examine the present New York law with respect to this latter con-'
cept. Particular attention will be paid to defects in New York law and the

possible curative effect of the recently enacted Criminal Procedure Law.8
1. There are three principal tests whereby a defendant may be acquitted by reason
of insanity. The most frequently applied is the so called M'Naghten rule. Briefly
stated the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if at the time of the act he did
not know the nature or quality of the act, or if he did, he did not know that it was
wrong. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). The test applied in the District
of Columbia and New Hampshire is the so called Durham rule, under which an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862(D.C. Cir. 1954). The third
test is that proposed by the Model Penal Code. Under this test
[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
2. There is a great deal of literature in this area. See T. SzAsz, PsyciiiATRic
JusticE (1965); Bennets, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. CaIM.
L.C. & P.S. 569 (1968); Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. Civ.
RIG-Ts-Crv. LiB. L. REv. 379 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Eizenstat]; Hess & Thomas,
Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 Ass. J. PsYcIAmY
713 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hess & Thomas]; Silving, The Criminal Law of Mental
Incapacity, 53 J. Ca im. L.C. & P.S. 129 (1969); Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to
Stand Trial, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 593 (1960); Comment, Incompetency to Stand Trial,
81 HARv. L. REv. 454 (1967).
3. [1970] N.Y. Sass. LAws ch. 996. The Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter cited as
CPL] is to become effective Sept. 1, 1971. [1970] N.Y. Sass. LAws ch. 996, § 5.

COMMENTS
I. COMMON LAW

At common law, an accused could not be required to plead to an indictment, nor be tried for a crime, if his mental state were such that he
could not understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him and assist in his defense.4 The rationale for this policy was threefold.
First, in accord with the ban against trials in absentia, it was believed that
the defendant should be mentally as well as physically present throughout
the proceedings. Second, the inability of a defendant to assist in his defense
raised the possibility that an innocent party might be convicted, and
finally, it was thought inhumane to try a mental incompetent. 5
An examination into the competency of the defendant was held only
where the judge had reason to believe that the defendant was unable to
proceed. 6 Once the issue was raised, the manner of determination was
within the judge's discretion. He was free to summon a jury upon the
question or decide it himself. 7 Upon a finding of incompetency, the practice seems to have been to commit the accused to jail until such time as
the judge determined his competency restored.8 When the defendant was
found competent, there was no appeal from the incompetency hearing itself, although the issue could be raised on appeal from the criminal trial.
However, the trial judge's decision was generally sustained unless found to
be dearly arbitrary.9

II. IMPORTANT INNOVATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

The common law doctrine against bringing a mentally incompetent
defendant to trial is presently codified in the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure. 10 The provisions contained therein, however, have raised a
number of serious problems concerning the rights of the individual and
4. H. WEiHoFEN, MAfNTAL DIsoRDER AS A CRIeMNAL DEFENSE 429 (1954) [hereinafter cited as WEIROFEN. For a history of the rule of incompetency see, e.g., Youtsey
v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-46 (6th Cir. 1899).
5. 4 W. BLAcKSrONE, CormbrNTAms 24-25 (Shareswood ed. 1868). American courts
have added the constitutional rationale that trial of an incompetent defendant would
violate due process. See, e.g., United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D.
Pa. 1951).
6. WEiHOFEN, at 444.
7. Id. at 445-47.
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hathaway, 13 Mass. 399 (1816); Commonwealth v.
Braley, I Mass. 103 (1804). In Hawie v. Hawie, 128 Miss. 473, 91 So. 131 (1922), the
court held that in the absence of statutes the judge only had power to order the
incompetent confined in jail.
9.

10.

WEIHOSEN, at 474.

N.Y. CODE CRim. PROC. §§ 658-62, 870-76 (McKinney 1968).
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have resulted in considerable criticism in this regard." It is little wonder
that some of the principal innovations in the new Criminal Procedure
Law deal with the question of the mental fitness of a defendant to stand
trial.12
A. Regulation of Standards

Not the least of the problems under the present Code concerns control
over the standard to be applied in determining those who are competent
to stand trial. The test of competency is a legal and not a medical one.13
It may be simply stated: "Does the accused have possession of such mental
faculties as to be able to understand the nature of the charge or of making
his defense?"' 4 As one court has noted:
Ability to make a defense ...

means more than capacity to discuss

his case with his attorney, answer questions, and to understand the
nature of legal proceedings. If [the defendant] is to go to trial, he
should be able to discuss with counsel, rationally, the facts relating
to his case which are within his recollection. He should also be
able, rationally, to consider the evidence offered against him, to
advise with his attorney concerning it, and to make such decisions
as it may be necessary for him to make during the course of such
a trial."15

In light of the essentially legal nature of the determination to be
made, it is understandable that -there should be some measure of confusion
among the psychiatric experts as to exactly what standard is to be applied.
One recent study in this field included a survey of seven consulting psychiatrists of a leading New York psychiatric hospital as to their understanding of the standard to be applied in a competency examination. Four
of the psychiatrists felt that the existence of psychosis was the criterion; one
followed the so-called Durham rule;' 6 and only two answered by stating the
law.' 7 Nor does it appear that this circumstance is peculiar to New York.
11. See Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome Extended: The Treatment of Mentally Ill "Non Criminal Criminals" in New York, 18 BUFFALO L. REv.
393 (1969); Vann & Morganforth, Psychiatrists and the Competence to Stand Trial,
42 U. DET. L.J. 75 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Vann & Morganforth]; Vann & Morganforth, The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the Competence to Stand Trial,
43 U. DEr. L. J. 1 (1965).
12. This view was expressed by the Governor in his memorandum, upon signing
the CPL into law on May 20, 1970. [1970] N.Y. Sss. LAws 3140-41.
13. See People v. DeFrancesco, 20 Misc. 2d 854, 193 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
People v. Wolfe, 198 Misc. 695, 103 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Kings Cty. Ct. 1950); People v.
Invin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N.Y.S.2d 548 (New York Cty. Ct. 1938).
14. People ex rel. Butler v. McNeill, 30 Misc. 2d 722, 725, 219 N.Y.S2d 722, 725
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
15. People ex rel. Bernstein v. McNeill, 48 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
16. See supra note 1.
17. Vann & Morganforth, at 84.
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A similar study in Michigan noted that the vast majority of psychiatrists
confused the legal standards for incompetency with those of responsibility,
while in those instances where no confusion was shown, the psychiatrist
with little or no explanation simply parroted the statutory language's
Criticism has also been directed at the paucity of information contained in the psychiatric report. In many cases, the report contains only a
formal statement that the defendant has been found to be mentally ill.19
Further, the short length of time devoted to the actual examination of the
defendant is often suggested as a reason for the inadequate amount of information provided.2 0
It has also been found that in many cases the attitude of the individual
psychiatrist with regard to the function of the incompetency proceeding
may lead to results quite incompatible with its proper function. Frequently,
the commitment of the accused upon a determination of incompetency is
seen as an alternative to the penal system. In those cases where the psychiatric expert is reluctant to find the defendant competent to stand trial
because of a desire to spare him the harsh consequences of imprisonment,
the competency proceeding provides a "humane" vehicle whereby the defendant can be removed from society to a mental hospital.2 ' The possibilities for abuse in this regard are easily seen. As John Stuart Mill has noted:
"The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warranty." 22
These conditions assume even greater import when we consider that
in practice, the courts generally accept the psychiatric determinations of
competence without question.2
The CPL has made an attempt to increase control over the standard
applied in determination of the competency of the defendant through a
detailed explanation of what information should be contained in the examination report presented to the court by the psychiatric examiner.2 4
Thus it is provided that if the psychiatrist finds that the defendant is an
incapacitated person "his diagnosis and prognosis and a detailed statement
of the reasons for his opinion by making particular reference to those
aspects of the proceedings wherein the defendant lacks capacity to under18. Hess & Thomas, at 715.
19. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE Crry OF NEW YORK AND CORNELL LAW SCHOOL,
MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS

227 (1962).

20. Id.
21. Vann & Morganforth, at 81.
22. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Castell ed. 1947).
23. McGarry, Competency for Trial and Due Process Via the State Hospital, 122
Am. J. PsYcmATRY 623, 626 (1965).
24. CPL § 730.10-9.
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stand or to assist in his own defense" 25 are to be included in the examination report furnished to the court. Further, the report must contain inform2
As was
mation concerning the nature and extent of the examination.
noted by the draftsmen of this provision, these requirements "are designed
to furnish a court with meaningful data and to promote a uniform adminThe standard form will
istration of the 'fitness to proceed' standard ....
serve to inform the examiners of the scope of their duties.2 27
The new provision is a valuable addition in that it both alerts the
psychiatric examiner as to the specific information the court is seeking,28
and also compels the examiner to frame his determination within the
limits of that information.
The fact that the CPL has taken an important step in insuring that
the proper standard in determining the competency of a defendant to stand
trial is understood by the psychiatric examiner does not dispose of a related consideration-i.e., the ability of the psychiatrist to apply the standard. Szasz has suggested that the psychiatrist can play no part in the competency proceeding "either as decision-maker or as provider of 'expert
opinion.' "29 Hess and Thomas seemingly agree in concluding that
concurrence of opinion between psychiatry and law can take place
only in the case of those defendants who are so ill, either psychically or organically, as to be uncommunicative or to present such
a public spectacle as to embarass our sensibilities of fairness and
decorum.30
The question which the psychiatrist expert is required to answer is,
in one sense, deceptively simple-is or is not this particular individual
competent to stand trial? In practice, however, the cases generally do not
fall so neatly into categories of black or white, yes or no. In the majority
of cases the psychiatrist may not present that information required by the
court.3 1 As one recent study noted:

Some of these psychiatrists [who refuse to participate in competency examinations] maintain that the procedures established by
the courts force them to answer questions which are not medical
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. CPL § 730.10-9, Comment.
28. As one observer has noted, "MIThere has been a consistent failure by the court
to inform the examining psychiatrist what questions it wishes answered." Robey,
Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J.
PSYCHITRY 616 (1965).
29. T. SzAsz, PsYcHuAThIc JusTcE 255 (1965). Dr. Szasz is a leading authority in
this area. For a critical examination of the relationship between law and psychiatry ill
general, see T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963).
30.

Hess and Thomas, at 720.

31.

Id. at 718.
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in nature.... Indeed, they are reticent to participate in general
legal proceedings because the rules of evidence, in their view,
militate against providing courts with the kinds of information
about personality that psychiatrists are trained to understand.3 2
Nor can we overlook the observation that, as a rule, psychiatrists have
little knowledge of what is necessary to understand a trial and to assist
counsel.33
In effect, therefore, we find a "communication gap" in this area.3 4
As the District of Columbia Circuit has noted, in another context: "While
the law should resist any effort of another discipline to impose its terms
upon the law, judges should be hospitable to allowing technical experts
to express themselves in terms meaningful to them. . . ."n At first glance
the new provision is likely to appear as a step in the wrong direction, in
that it requires the psychiatric expert to frame his report in terms of a
legal, rather than a medical nature-i.e., specific reference to those factors
"wherein the defendant lacks capacity to understand or to assist in his
own defense." 86 It must be noted, however, that this phrase as presented
in the statute does not serve as language of limitation. There is nothing
in the statute to preclude additional reference to the mental condition of
the defendant in medical terms. In fact such is specifically called for in
the examination report, for the report is to include the examiner's "diagnosis and prognosis"3 7 of the defendant, which presumably will appear in
the form of the technical jargon of the medical profession.
Nevertheless, the possible inability of the psychiatric expert to apply
the standard of competency to stand trial, coupled with the possibility
that in a hopefully limited number of cases certain unarticulated factors
may weigh in the examiner's decisions, suggest that this new provision
should not trigger a false sense of security within the judiciary that the
proper standard has been applied in any particular case. These considerations, rather, serve to emphasize the importance of a fundamental concept
in this area-namely, that the ultimate determination as to the competency
of a defendant must be made by the court.38 For example, in People v.
32. Vann & Morganforth, at 78.
33.

Slovenko, Psychiatry, Criminal Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 1963

DuKE L.J. 395, 410.
34. See generally Lawrence, Sanity: The Psychiatrico-Legal Communicative Gap, 27
OHIO S.L.J. 219 (1966).

35. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
36. CPL § 730.10-9.
37. Id.

38. The question is to be determined by the court alone. Under present New
York and federal practice the defendant is not entitled to a jury trial determination. See
United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 1966); People ex rel. Klesitz v. Mills,
179 Misc. 58, 61-65, 37 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189-91 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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Greene,8 9 where the defendant was charged with first degree murder, the
court held that since it was of the opinion that the defendant was unable
to make his defense, he would be committed to the state hospital until
sufficiently recovered so that proceedings might be resumed. The determination was made despite a report of hospital examiners that the defendant was capable of understanding the charge, the proceedings and of
making his defense.40 The opinion quotes at length from the memorandum of then Assistant District Attorney Fuld, now Chief Judge Fuld of
the Court of Appeals, who was the chief sponsor of the 1942 amendment to
the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4 ' As Fuld noted:
[l]t seems essential, for the proper administration of the law-particularly since the amendment providing specifically for a hearing
contemplates cases wherein the Court will not confirm the psychiatrist's findings-that the Court be vested with an independent
power and duty of reaching a conclusion concerning the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings and to make his defense.4
The fact that in practice, the courts generally have accepted the psychiatric determinations of competence without question leads to two possible conclusions. First, it is possible that generally the examiner's determination has been right. However, in view of the great confusion which
has existed with respect to exactly what was being determined, this conclusion is less probable than the second, that the judiciary has abdicated
its responsibility in this area in favor of decision by the psychiatric expert.
What is called for, therefore, is a determined effort within the judiciary
48
itself to bring the practice in line with the theory.
39. 203 Misc. 191, 116 N.Y.S2d 561 (Kings Cty. Ct. 1952).
40. It should be noted that there were independent psychiatric findings to substantiate the decision of the court. See People v. Swallow, 60 Misc. 2d 171, 801 N.Y.S.Rd
798 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
41. The 1942 amendment to section 662 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
found in chapter 284 of the 1942 Session Laws of New York. The relevant provisions
of the present section 662-b (1) of the Code are exactly the same as those found in the
1942 amendment to that section. Thus Fuld's analysis may be applied to the present
provision.
42. People v. Green, 203 Misc. 191, 193-94, 116 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (Kings Cty. Ct.
1952).
43. I believe every District Judge will and can avoid eventual trouble and
therefore administer justice more effectively if, but only if, he approaches
a Section 4244 competency hearing on the general theory neither the
District Attorney, the defense attorney, nor any 'of the witnesses, professional or otherwise, have the vaguest idea about the purpose of the
hearing, the scope of the evidence, the specific issue for ultimate deci-

sion; or, indeed, really why everyone gathered in your courtroom.

Oliver, J., Judicial Hearings To Determine Mental Competency To Stand Trial, 39
F.R.D. 537, 545 (1965).

COMMENTS
B.

Limitation on Detention

Another major problem under the present provisions of the Code in
the area of confinement of the incompetent defendant arises in connection
with the length of time of such confinement 4 4 The principal inadequacy
here concerns those individuals committed to a hospital for the criminally
insane. One recent study in New York based on data compiled in 1965
discovered that the average stay at Matteawan State Hospital was between
six and seven years, while the average length of hospitalization at Department of Mental Hygiene hospitals was four months.4 5 This is of particular importance for our consideration since in August, 1965, of the 1654
individuals confined at Matteawan, 820 were confined as incompetent to
stand trial 6 Hess and Thomas, in their study of those committed as
incompetent to stand trial in Michigan from January, 1954, to January,
1960, projected that more than one half would spend the remainder of
their lives confined to the hospital 47 The length of such confinement is
especially disturbing in light of the fact that some authorities have conceded that generally if an individual is not progressing toward recovery
within a few years, regression begins.4 8
The problem of long confinement is complicated further, by the
fact that the confusion surrounding the proper standards to apply may
follow the defendant to the hospital.49 Where the limited objective sought
with respect to the incompetent defendant is not recognized, treatment
may not differ from that provided patients committed for other reasons.
Hess and Thomas noted that at no time did the incompetent patients'
44. Under the present Code an individual indicted for a felony or misdemeanor
found incompetent to stand trial must be committed to an appropriate institution until
such time as the defendant is no longer incompetent. N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. § 662-b
(McKinney Supp. 1970).
45. Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally ll Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction
of the State of New York, 17 BuFFmA o L. REv. 651, 656 (1968). Under the present Code
the determination as to whether to commit an incompetent defendant to a mental hospital or a hospital for the criminally insane is within the discretion of the Commissioner
of Mental Hygiene. N.Y. CoDE CIm. PRoc. § 662-b (1) (McKinney Supp. 1970). Under the
CPL the commissioner may exercise such discretion only with respect to those individuals
determined by the court to be dangerously incapacitated. CPL § 730.60-1. A dangerous
incapacitated person is defined as
an incapacitated person who is so mentally ill or mentally defective that his
presence in an institution operated by the department of mental hygiene is
dangerous to the safety of other patients therein, the staff of the institution or the community.
CPL § 750.10-2.
46. Morris, supra note 45, at 658 n-53.
47. Hess & Thomas, at 717-18.
48. Eizenstat, at 406-07.
49. Id. at 391.
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records, progress reports, or staff conference studies refer to the legal
standards of competency.50 Frequently the staff disagreed with the diagnosis by the examining doctor at the time of the hearing and not uncommonly could not-understand why the defendant was committed. 1
It is with respect to these problems that some of the most important
innovations in the CPL have been made. The first such innovation is
the requirement of periodic judicial review of the need for continued hospitalization. Under the new system, if, immediately prior to expiration of
the one year period prescribed by a temporary order of commitment, the
defendant remains in the custody of the commissioner and if the superintendant of the institution where the defendant is confined is of the opinion
that the defendant remains an incapacitated or dangerous incapacitated
person, such superintendant must apply to the court which issued the
order of commitment for an order of retention. 2 The superintendant
must make such application within sixty days prior to the expiration of
the order of commitment and must give notice of the application to the
defendant and to the mental health information service.53 Thereupon,
the court, of its own motion, may conduct a hearing as to the defendant's
incapacity or dangerousness. The court must conduct a hearing on such
issues, however, upon motion of the defendant or of the mental health
service, provided that such motion is made within ten days after the receipt
of notice of the application54
If, after such hearing, the court is of the opinion that the defendant
is no longer incapacitated, the criminal action must proceed. 5 However, if
after such hearing, the court is of the opinion that the defendant remains
an incapacitated person, or, if no motion for a hearing was made, the
court must issue an order of retention, whereby the defendant is committed
to the custody of the commissioner for a period not to exceed one year.5 0
50.

Hess & Thomas, at 717.

51. Id. at 716.
52. CPL § 730.50-2. It should be noted that the procedure to issue an order of
retention applies only to those individuals who have been indicted for a felony or

presently convicted of a felony and found incapacitated. The procedure for those indicted
for non-felony offenses is contained in CPL § 730.50-1. The procedure for those defendants charged by an accusatory instrument other than an indictment is contained
in CPL § 730.40. In both of the latter cases, commitment pursuant to the CPL cannot
exceed 90 days. It should be noted, however, that any defendant who can no longer be
confined pursuant to the CPL, including those indicted for felony who have been in
custody of the commissioner for the maximum period allowed (see note 61 infra and
accompanying text) may be committed to a mental hospital through a civil proceeding.
CPL § 730.70.
53. CPL § 730.50-2.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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If, upon expiration of the one year period of retention, the defendant
remains in the custody of the commissioner, the procedure outlined above
is to be followed for all subsequent orders of retention.57 Such subsequent
orders of retention authorize commitment for a period not to exceed two
years. 158
This procedure is beneficial in two respects. First, it requires the court
periodically to reexamine its initial determination as to the capacity of the
defendant to proceed to trial. The court can no longer "forget about"
the defendant.5 9 Second, the provision requires the hospital superintendent
periodically to reexamine the defendant in terms of his competency to
stand trial. Hopefully, through such review, focused upon the reason for
the defendant's commitment, the therapy administered during commitment
similarly will focus upon the limited goal of returning the defendant to
trial.60
Under the second major innovation, the aggregate length of such
detention is limited to two-thirds of the length of time for which the
defendant could have been imprisoned under the maximum authorized
sentence for the highest class felony for which he was charged. 1 This will
eliminate the indeterminate nature of confinement under the present
62
Code.
The problem remains, however, that prolonged confinement in state
hospitals for the criminally insane is to a great extent caused by the nature
of the institution itself. As one observer has noted: "[I]nvariably this is the
most unattractive, ill-equipped, and poorly-staffed division of our state
psychiatric hospitals." 63 While there, the defendant is held in stricter custody and has fewer privileges than those confined in prison or ordinary
57. Id. § 730.50-3.
58. Id.
59. In the Michigan study, the authors "were amazed to learn of the almost total
lack of interest the court took in the defendant after his commitment." Hess & Thomas,
at 716.
60. Hess and Thomas have estimated that if therapy were directed toward this
more limited goal, utilizing existing facilities, the majority of those unfit to proceed
could be returned for trial within a short period of time. Hess & Thomas, at 716.
61. CPL § 730.50-3. The two-thirds figure der~ves from the fact that under the
revised penal law a defendant serving an indeterminate sentence may receive for good
behavior, time allowances of one-third of his maximum term. N.Y. PENAL LAw §
70.30 (4) (McKinney 1968).
62. For example, in 1901, a 19 year old boy was indicted for burglary. Upon being
found mentally unfit to proceed to trial, he was committed to Matteawan State Hospital.
In 1965, this defendant-then 83 years old and continuously confined for 64 years-was
the patient longest in residence at Matteawan. Morris, supra note 45, at 657.
63. Guttmacher, The Psychiatric Approach To Crime And Correction, 23 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 633, 645 (1958).
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mental hospitals.6 4 Further, he receives little treatment, usually less than
5
The confineif he had been civilly committed to a mental institution.
ment in a segregated unit may in itself deprive the defendant of the opportunity for such treatment as psychotherapy, psychological testing and group
therapy.66 Obviously there is little which a statute regulating criminal
procedure can do in this regard. What is called for, therefore, is a critical
examination of the adequacy of our state hospitals for the criminally
insane.
C. Motions While Confined
Under the present Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant who is
found unfit to proceed and who is in the custody of the commissioner,
may not make any motions attacking the validity of the indictment pending against him. The case of United States v. Barnes67 is illustrative of
the possible consequences of such a ban.
In Barnes, four military prisoners had killed a fellow prisoner, and
in 1949 the four were convicted of murder by a military court martial.
Ten years after this conviction, the Supreme Court sustained the defendants' contention that under section 92 of the Articles of War the military
tribunal had had no jurisdiction over a case of murder committed within
the continental United States in time of peace.6 8 Subsequently, in 1959,
the defendants were indicted in a federal district court. The court, relying
primarily on United States v. Provoo,6 9 granted a motion to dismiss as to
three of the defendants on the ground that the ten-year delay, occasioned
not through the fault of the defendants but as a result of a calculated
tactical move by the government, denied the defendants their constitutional right to a speedy trial. As to the fourth defendant, however, one
Clarence Coons, the indictment was not dismissed. Rather, in view of the
fact that Coons had been serving his military life sentence in a federal
institution for the criminally insane and upon observation of his conduct
in court, a psychiatric examination was ordered pursuant to the federal
64. See Brief of Donald McEwan, Petitioner Pro Se, in J. KATZ, J. GowsraN &
A. DRSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 700-03 (1967), where an inmate
lists all the depiuivations he suffers as a result of being confined to an institution for
the criminally insane.
65. Foote, A Comment On Pretrial Commitment Of Criminal Defendants, 108
U. PA. L. Rav. 832, 843 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Foote]; McGarry, Competency for
Trial and Due Process Via the State Hospital, 122 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY, 623, 626 (1965).
66. Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEx. L. Rav. 849, 860 (1960).
67. 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
68. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
69. 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
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statute governing determination of mental competence to stand trial. 70
Upon examination and hearing, Coons was found to be "presently insane
and so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings
against him," 71 and was thus returned to the federal institution, presumably until such time as he should be sufficiently recovered to "participate"
in the dismissal of the indictment against him.
While the disposition of the Coon's case may be an extreme example
of injustice visited upon a defendant by a policy originally designed for
his protection, other circumstances can be imagined where similar results
might follow. For example, defense counsel may be able to show that
prosecution is barred as a matter of law; that the indictment discloses on
its face that the statute of limitations has run; that essential evidence has
been obtained through an illegal search and seizure; or that the defendant
has available an affirmative defense the presentation of which does not
require his personal participation.72
In recognition of such possibilities, the CPL contains a new provision
under which a defendant in the custody of the commissioner pursuant to
an order of commitment or an order of retention may make any motion
authorized under the CPL "which is susceptible of fair determination
without his personal participation."73 The new rule represents a relaxation of the present rigid law in this area.
It might be argued that the CPL has not gone far enough in this
respect. At least one authority has proposed a plan whereby at the defense
counsel's option the case would be tried on the merits without foreclosing
the protection afforded by the incompetency plea. 74 A procedure very
similar to this proposal was actually followed in a recent English case,
Regina v. Roberts,75 in which the Queen's Bench held that defense counsel
could try the issue of his client's guilt prior to a determination of competency without sacrificing the incompetency plea. As the court reasoned:
[T]o insist on the issue of fitness to plead being tried [first] might
result in the grave injustice of detaining as a criminal lunatic a
man who was quite innocent; indeed, it might result in the public
mischief that a person so detained would be assumed, in the eyes
of the police and of the authorities, to have been the person re70.
71.

18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-48 (1964).
United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60, 65 (S.D. Cal. 1959).

72. Foote, at 841.
73. CPL § 730.60-5. See Model Penal Code § 4.06 (3)
1962).
74. Foote, at 845-46.
75. [19 54] 2 Q.B. 329.

(Proposed Official Draft,
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sponsible for the crime-whether he was or not-and investigations which might have led to the apprehension of the true criminal would not take place. 76
The court indicated that should the defendant be found responsible for
the crime, but at the same time incompetent for trial, he would be sent
to a hospital for the criminally insane. The court failed to discuss, however, the difficult problem of what disposition is to be made if and when
-the defendant's competency is restored. Under Professor Foote's proposal,
however, the defendant is to be committed "until he is sufficiently recovered to be retried or until other appropriate disposition can be made of
77
the case."
While Professor Foote's proposal merits further study, adoption of
such a radical procedure is unlikely until such time as the theoretical
hurdle it presents can be overcome-i.e., the intentional trial of a legally
incapacitated individual. As has been evident throughout this entire discussion the policy against bringing such individuals to trial is one deeply
rooted in our system of jurisprudence. The new provision of the CPL is,
however, easily accommodated within this historical framework and to the
extent that it prevents results similar to that in Barnes, it is a meaningful
change in New York procedure.

III.

OTHER CHANGES

Aside from the tremendously important changes outlined above, the
CPL also contains a number of other innovations which merit comment.
While under the present Code the defendant is confined in all cases
until a psychiatric examination ordered to determine his competency to
stand trial has been completed, under the CPL in those cases where the
defendant has been released on bail or on his own recognizance the court
may, in its discretion, direct that such examination be conducted on an
out-patient basis.js The rationale behind this provision is that the status
of an accused who has been released on bail should not be altered merely
because of pretrial examination has been ordered for him. 70
76. Id. at 333. Roberts was not followed in Regina v. Benyon, [1957] 2 Q.B. 111,
where the court held that a jury must be sworn to try the fitness of a defendant to
plead as a preliminary issue.
77. Foote, at 846.

78. CPL § 730.20-2. Note also that where the director of the hospital who has
received an order of examination is of the opinion that confinement is necessary for
an effective examination, the court may order confinement. Id.
79. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DisTRIr OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT OF TiE
CoeMrrrEE ON PROBLEMS CONNEGED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE AccusED IN
CRIMINAL CASEs BEFORE TRIAL, Recommendation No. 7 (1965).
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Another change found in the CPL concerns the procedure for indictment of a defendant presently accused under a felony complaint and found
incompetent to stand trial. Under present law, upon the defendant's commitment, "all proceedings against the defendant before the court or magistrate ordered the examination shall terminate."80 However, the district
attorney is free to reopen the matter at any time by presenting the case
to a grand jury unless, after the expiration of six months from the date
of the defendant's commitment, he has stated in writing his determination
not to reopen the case.81 Under the CPL provision, where the district
attorney is of the belief that circumstances warrant the filing of an indictment, the charge contained in a felony complaint must be presented to a
grand jury within six months after the expiration of the period prescribed
in the temporary order.82 An indictment filed thereafter must be dismissed
unless a superior court is satisfied that there was good cause for the delayed
filing.83
Under the present Code the examination report ordered in the incompetency examination cannot be received in evidence upon the trial of the
defendant.8 4 Federal practices 5 prohibits the admission into evidence of
any statement made by a defendant in the course of a psychiatric examination on the issue of his guilt.8 6 The CPL has expanded upon this policy
by making inadmissible in evidence against the defendant in any criminal
action any statement made by him for examination or treatment except
on the issue of his mental condition.8 7 Such statements are admissible,
however, on the issue of the defendant's mental condition regardless of
the fact that they may otherwise be deemed privileged communications.8 8

IV.

WHAT REMAINS UNDONE

Having discussed at length the extent to which the CPL has made
substantial reforms with respect to the proper handling of the problem of
the mentally incompetent defendant, consideration of what yet remains to
be done is in order.
80. N.Y. CODE C~im. PRoc. § 872 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
81. Id.
82. CPL § 730.40-5.
83. Id.
84. N.Y. CODE CRIM. P oc. § 662 (McKinney Supp. 1970). See People v. Roth, 11
N.Y.2d 80, 181 N.E.2d 440, 226 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964).
86. See Wallace v. United States, 860 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1966).
87. CPL § 730.20-6.
88. Id.
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As has already been noted, continued retention of a defendant as an
incapacitated person under the GPL can be achieved only through periodic
hearings on the issue of the need for such retention.89 Obviously such procedure is merely a sham if the resulting hearing fails to square with our
concept of fundamental fairness. In this respect the plight of the indigent
defendant is cause for particular concern.
Although the CPL has taken an important step toward protection of
the rights of the indigent defendant through involving the Mental Health
Information Service in the confinement process,9 0 this provision does not
go far enough. One of the functions of the service is to aid the patient,
but such aid consists primarily of notifying him of his rights, advising him
as to procedures, and following the patient's progress while hospitalized.0 1
The Mental Health Information Service is not designed to provide legal
counsel.
The right to counsel is recognized as a fundamental right in a criminal
prosecution. 92 While retention of a defendant as an incapacitated person
under the provisions now under consideration is not punishment for a
crime in a technical sense, the resulting confinement does represent a loss
of liberty to the defendant.93
Under section 35 of the Judiciary LawM the court may assign counsel
to represent an indigent person during a hearing brought to retain such
individual in a state hospital where the individual is alleged "to be mentally ill, mentally defective or a narcotic addict." Under a literal interpretation of this statutory language a hearing "to determine the issue of capacity" conducted pursuant to the provisions presently under consideration is
excluded from the application of section 35. It is suggested, therefore,
that section 35 of the Judiciary Law be amended to include a retention
hearing conducted pursuant to section 730.50 of the CPL.95
89. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.

90. CPL § 730.50-2. It is the duty of the Mental Health Information Service to advise

the patient of his right to have a judicial hearing and review of his case, to be represented by legal counsel and to seek independent medical opinion. Further, the service
is to provide the court all the relevant information as to the patient's case, including information as to his right to discharge. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 88

(McKinney Supp. 1970).
91. Botein, The New Hospitalization Provisions of New York's Mental Hygiene
Law, 38 N.Y.S.B.J. 17, 19 (1966).
92. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

93. The Legislature has recognized this fact through enactment of section 70.80(3)
of the New York Penal Law, which credits the amount of time spent by a defendant in
custody prior to conviction to the amount of time to be served after conviction.
94. N.Y. JunicrARY LAw § 35-1 (McKinney 1968).
95. CPL § 730.50.
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Hopefully, thereafter, the judicial construction of the discretionary
language of section 35 with respect to the incompetent defendant will
parallel that announced in People ex rel. Rogers v. StanleyY6 where the
Court of Appeals held that an indigent mental patient confined in a state
mental hospital was by constitutional right entitled to the assignment of
counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding brought to establish his sanity.
Equally important to the indigent defendant in a retention hearing is
the availability of independent psychiatric experts. As the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has noted in a similar context, the type of
hearing contemplated by these provisions is valueless
unless expert testimony [is] available to [the defendant] to rebut
the opinion evidence of the staff of the institution who believed
he should be continued in custody.
No careful judge is likely to assume the responsibility of
allow-ing an alleged insane person to go free when the sole expert
opinion in the record advises him that such a course is dangerous
to the community.9 7
In recognition of such considerations, section 35 of the Judiciary Law
also provides that the court may appoint no more than two psychiatrists
or physicians to examine an indigent and testify at the hearing upon his
condition. 98 Once again, however, the language is discretionary in nature.
Thus, in People ex rel. Hernandez v. Johnston99 the Dutchess County
Supreme Court held that it was not required by the predecessor of section
35100 to appoint an independent psychiatrist to examine an inmate at
Matteawan seeking habeas corpus relief. 01
In light of the possible importance of the information an independent
psychiatrist may make available to the court, and in light of the fact that
but for the particular individual's indigency he could present independent
psychiatric experts in his own behalf, it is suggested that section 35 be

96. 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966).
97. DeMarcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
98. N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAW § 35-3 (McKinney 1968).
99. 47 Misc. 2d 145, 262 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
100. N.Y. JunxciARY LAW § 32, repealed, [1966] N.Y. SEss. LAWs ch. 761, § 5.
101. In People ex rel. Sweeting v. Johnston, 26 App. Div. 2d 685, 272 N.Y.S.2d
437 (2d Dep't 1966), the court recognized the value of independent psycdiatric information. The court held that where the record in a habeas corpus proceeding did not
provide an adequate basis upon which to make a reasoned determination as to whether
an inmate of a state hospital was presently capable of understanding the criminal
charge lodged against him and of making his defense, the court should be assisted by
the opinion of an independent disinterested psychiatrist.
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amended so as to make appointment of independent psychiatrists mandatory upon the request of an indigent defendant. 0 2

V.

CONCLUSION

Recent research in one New York county discovered that in the ten year
period covered by the study there was not one plea of "not guilty by reason
of insanity" in any local trial in the county criminal courts. Rather, all
cases involving questions of the mental condition of the accused were
resolved at the pretrial stage.10 3 While we can only speculate as to the
reason for this situation, it is possible that reluctance to try a mentally
ill person, coupled with the limited possibility of acquittal by reason of
insanity under a restricted interpretation of criminal non-responsibility,
makes the incompetency proceeding an attractive vehicle whereby the
judiciary is able to short-circuit the normal criminal proceeding.104 The
evidence discovered by Hess and Thomas, in their study, reinforces the
likelihood of this possibility. They concluded that
the issue of the defendant's competency to be tried was most fre-

quently raised not on the basis of the defendant's mental status
but rather was employed as a means of handling situations and

solving problems for which there seemed to be no other recourse
under the law.

05

These observations raise an issue well beyond the scope of this comment-i.e., the desirability of a system of criminal law built upon the so
called disease model of criminality and directed primarily toward rehabilitation rather than punishment.

06

If a reconstitution of the correctional

process is deemed necessary, well and good. But until that time it must
be stressed that reliance upon the mental incompetency proceeding must

102. In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953), the
Supreme Court upheld the finding of the lower courts that a state was not constitutionally required to provide psychiatric assistance for indigents.
103. Vann & Morganforth, The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the
Competence to Stand Trial, 43 U. DET. LJ. 1, 3 (1965).
104. Weihofen predicted that any reform in the method of trying persons alleged
to be insane would probably come through perfecting means for preventing the trial
of mentally disordered persons rather than through a change in the substantive law or
procedure relating to the question of responsibilty. WEmoFEN, at 428.
105. Hess and Thomas, at 714-15.
106. For a discussion of the so-called disease model of criminality see Katz,
Dangerousness: A Theoretical Reconstruction of the Criminal Law, 19 BuFFAIo L. REv.
1 (1969). But see SzAsz, Justice in the Therapeutic State, 3 IND. LEGAL FoRum 20 (1969).
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be restricted to the limited goal it was designed to achieve-providing care
and treatment to the incompetent defendant until such time as fie is fit to
proceed to trial.107
PAUL A.

BATTAGLIA

THE FCC's FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN OPERATION
I.

THE PROBLEM

The Office of Complaints and Compliance of the Federal Communications Commission received a complaint on February 26, 1970, filed by
Donald Jelinek on behalf of the San Francisco Women for Peace, the G.I.
Association, and The Resistance against radio stations KSFO, KCBS, and
and others in the San Francisco Bay area. According to Mr. Jelinek, "[t]he
complaint arises from the refusal by the above-named licensees to broadcast public service announcements expressing a viewpoint opposed to the
viewpoint expressed in public service announcements sponsored by various
i
branches of the United States' armed forces."
The following is an example of the United States' armed forces spots
that have been repeatedly broadcast by the licensees and that inspired the

petioners to act:
We understand you're looking for a man's job. Well we may just
have one. Who are we? We've been in business since 1775. We're
located in dose to 200 places around the world. We'll pay while
we are training you. Give you 30 days off per year. Give you a
chance to continue your education. And we'll build you a man.
We'll build you a marine. And that man and that marine will be
you. Ask a marine 2
The position taken by the petitioners is that "by their vary nature,
the military-sponsored recruitment announcements suggest that military
service is desirable-a contention whose controversy is certainly heightened
107. As Vann and Morganforth have concluded
If it is necessary to justify or change our theory of punishment or the
methods utilized in the process of imprisonment let us face up to these
needs as a society. We suggest that we axe not 'helping' these persons by
finding an alternative method for removing them from society and, in
effect, imprisoning them. We further suggest that in attempting to
develop and practice a concept of fairness, due process in the administration of justice, we have developed a practice which is a denial of the
very due process we are trying to emulate.
Vann &sMorganforth, The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the Competence
to Stand Trial, 43 U. DEr. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1965).
1. Complaint to the F.C.C. on behalf of San Francisco Women For Peace, #C2-1625

(Feb. 26, 1970).
2. Id.

